15 Dec 2025
Pyrrhonian scepticism seeks the state of being free from anxiety and worry or tranquillity (ataraxia) through the suspension of judgment (epoche). I will first briefly introduce Pyrrhonian scepticism to explain how one becomes a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I will then discuss how Pyrrhonian scepticism can lead to tranquillity. I argue that Sextus Empiricus’s claim that the ultimate goal, tranquillity, can always be achieved by being a Pyrrhonian Sceptic, is not plausible.
When we investigate something, say, proposition H, we have three choices regarding H (Inwood and Gerson 302-303):
(i) By investigating H, we discover something about H.
(ii) By investigating H, it is impossible for us to discover something about H.
(iii) By investigating H, we continue the investigation.
According to Sextus, Dogmatists and Academics will accept (i) and (ii) respectively, while Pyrrhonists accept (iii) (302-303). It suggests that Pyrrhonian Scepticism does not intend to find an ultimate truth or establish any epistemological claim about the world. Rather it suggests a lifestyle which is free from disturbance. That is, to practice Pyrrhonian scepticism, a Pyrrhonist does not assent to something non-evident1 (305). They embrace the sceptical ability, which is the capacity to form opposing arguments against each other with equal weight (equipollence), leading to a suspension of judgment and, ultimately, tranquillity (307). To genuinely consider whether H, a Pyrrhonist must examine both sides of H. That is, the argument in favour of H and the argument in favour of ~H (or something incompatible with H). Note that merely assessing one argument for H and then rejecting it is inadequate for suspension of judgment since he has not yet examined arguments supporting ~H. Furthermore, equal weight should be assigned to the argument in favour of H and the argument in favour of ~H. For example, when a Pyrrhonist is asked, ‘Does God exist?’, he then investigates and forms an argument for an affirmative answer and an argument for a negative answer (Barnes 59). Both answers are equally good and convincing. Therefore, a Pyrrhonist suspends judgment and cannot make a judgment about whether God exists, and he is now freed from puzzling questions like this. This ‘suspensive state’, as described by Sextus, allows one “who determines nothing in regard to things honourable or bad by nature not [to] flee or go after them excessively” (Inwood and Gerson 307). In other words, by not making definitive judgments about things, one remains detached, free from the desires (to honourable things) or aversions (to bad things) that often drive people who hold strong beliefs in them. This detachment in turn cultivates a sense of calm, freedom and tranquillity. To conclude, for Pyrrhonists, the sceptical ability is practiced through the order of investigation, opposition, equipollence, suspension of judgment and tranquillity (Barnes 59). By practicing Pyrrhonian scepticism, the Pyrrhonist will find tranquillity.
It seems plausible that we will obtain tranquillity when we suspend our judgment regarding those big questions like whether God exists. However, can we suspend our judgment for every non-evident matter?
The answer is negative. Consider the situation where Kal'tsit has an emergency and important meeting in New York tomorrow, and there is only one available flight that would allow Kal'tsit to arrive on time. Whether Kal'tsit will actually be able to attend the meeting is uncertain: it is a non-evident matter due to flight delays or cancellations. If Kal'tsit suspends belief on whether she will be able to attend the meeting by checking equal-weight arguments for (e.g., the airline rarely experiences delays) and against it (e.g., heavy rain is possible before take-off), she may still suffer from anxiety and indecision. Now, without the confidence to attend the meeting accordingly, being a Pyrrhonist cannot help Kal'tsit obtain tranquillity. I categorize cases similar to ‘Kal'tsit attending the meeting’ as the ‘Self-interest Case’, defined as follows:
Self-interest Case x is a Self-interest Case if and only if (a) a subject S cares about x because x is associated with S’s self-interest, and (b) the actualization of x would bring about good or bad consequences for S.
For example, suppose ‘attending the meeting’ is x, then Kal'tsit obviously cares about x because x is related to her job. Successfully attending the meeting would contribute to her work performance, while failure to attend would damage it. Therefore, ‘attending the meeting’ is a Self-interest Case for Ann. Similar examples such as ‘getting grades’ align with a student’s self-interest, where good grades make the student happy. When it comes to Self-interest Cases, Pyrrhonian scepticism fails to bring tranquillity. This is because suspending judgment on x does not change (a) and (b), just as suspending judgment does not help Kal'tsit improve her job performance or help a student achieve better grades. Thus, suspending judgment on Self-interest Cases is likely to cause anxiety rather than tranquillity. For Non-Self-interest Cases, such as the ‘existence of God’, Pyrrhonism might indeed bring tranquillity2. For example, if Kal'tsit is an atheist and does not care about God, whether God exists would not impact her salary, relationships, or sleep hours. In this case, suspending judgment about the existence of God may indeed allow Kal'tsit to be free from disturbance. In conclusion, a Pyrrhonist will not always obtain tranquillity by suspending judgment for every non-evident matter.
Although the suspension of judgment does not change (a) and (b), Pyrrhonian scepticism helps us to change our views of the nature of things, detaching from Self-interest Cases. Thus, we obtain tranquillity. The doctrine of Pyrrhonists suggests:
“For the one who believes that something is honourable or bad by nature will be disturbed...” (Inwood and Gerson 307).
According to the passage, when people believe that something is good or bad by nature, such as good job performance or good grades, they become emotionally attached to it. This attachment leads to a cycle of ‘immoderate’ emotions: elation when things are likely to go well, but also anxiety and fear when there is a possibility of failure. In other words, attaching inherent value to things creates a dependency on them for one’s attainment of tranquillity. Then what will Pyrrhonists do? They simply do not attach a certain value (i.e., goodness and badness) to things. They may acknowledge that improving job performance or getting a good grade could be preferable (under certain circumstances like self-actualization), but they do not view them as inherently good. By doing so, Pyrrhonists will “not flee or go after them excessively” (Inwood and Gerson 307). Thus, if uncertainty arises about jobs and grades, the Pyrrhonists remain undisturbed because their tranquillity does not rely on the specific consequence.
If Pyrrhonists are right about the detachment of the nature of things, how can Pyrrhonists possibly pursue anything? Pyrrhonian scepticism would undermine our motivation to pursue goals. When we no longer see things as inherently good or bad, we risk falling into a state where nothing seems worth pursuing. Therefore, we may feel disconnected from the very things that give life satisfaction. Gisela Striker gave her thoughts on this matter:
“Moreover, the state of tranquillity achieved by the skeptic will lack one important element..., namely contentment or satisfaction, the thought that one has or can easily get all the goods one might need... His peace of mind is mere detachment... but one that might, in the end, turn out to be also profoundly boring.” (Striker 106).
In the passage, Striker argues that Pyrrhonists cannot hold any belief in the inherent value of things due to their suspension of judgment on what is inherently good or bad. For example, they do not believe that things like health, relationships, or even tranquillity itself are inherently desirable. Pyrrhonist’s tranquillity, then, is a detachment in which they avoid committing to any beliefs about what is good. As a result, their tranquillity is mere emptiness since it lacks the satisfaction that comes from engaging with the world in a purposeful way and ultimately Pyrrhonists become ‘profoundly boring’ people. However, for many people, tranquillity involves a sense of security in knowing they have or can obtain what they need to live well. For a fisherman who only finds fishing can make his life meaningful, we cannot take fishing out of his life. In this case, what Pyrrhonian scepticism gives you is not tranquillity but emptiness.
Additionally, how can Pyrrhonists regard tranquillity as the goal of scepticism if the goal per se is not worth seeking in a Pyrrhonist’s life? This is logically puzzling. Here I borrow Bronwyn Finnigan’s finding from her The Paradox of Fear in Bodhicaryāvatāra3 (A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life) to explain the puzzle I find in Pyrrhonian scepticism: Why would one purposefully achieve tranquillity by practicing scepticism if one’s goal per se is not worth seeking (Finnigan 914)? Therefore, Pyrrhonists must reply to the dual role of tranquillity of being worth pursuing and worthless otherwise they are just being logically inconsistent.
1 Evident things are exceptions for Pyrrhonists to be sceptical about. For example, Pyrrhonists will not be sceptical about whether they feel cold. If they do feel cold, they will believe this evident matter.
2 A worry is, that the situation might get worse. Being a Pyrrhonist does not give you tranquillity since people tend to care about Self-interest Cases where suspending judgment does not work. For Non-Self-interest Cases like the existence of God – atheists are hardly disturbed by it since they just do not care!
3 Finnigan’s finding is similar to the paradox I identified in Pyrrhonian skepticism, in terms of form. Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra is similar to The Paradox of Fear where fear serves as both a motivator for action and a state to be overcome just as fear’s dual role generates a contradiction, so too does tranquillity’s role as both something we want and something worthless. If something is worthless, it is impossible for it to motivate rational beings to attain it.
Barnes, Jonathan. “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist.” The Original Sceptics: A Controversy, edited by Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede, Hackett Publishing Company, 1997, pp. 58-91.
Finnigan, Bronwyn. “The Paradox of Fear in Classical Indian Buddhism.” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49, 2021, pp. 913-929.
Inwood, Brad, and Lloyd P. Gerson, editors. Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Translated by Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson, Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.
Striker, Gisela. “ATARAXIA: HAPPINESS AS TRANQUILLITY.” The Monist, vol. 73, no. 1, 1990, pp. 97-110.